AccScience Publishing / EER / Online First / DOI: 10.36922/EER026320033
Submit to EER
Cite this article
69
Views
Related Info Links
Google Scholar
More by Authors Links
Xiao Liang
Journal Browser
Volume | Year
Issue
Search
News and Announcements
View All
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE

Rule of payoff and public participation in Chinese rural domestic wastewater treatment management

Xiao Liang1*
Show Less
1 Department of International Economics and Trade, College of Economics, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, Guangdong , China
EER, 026320033 https://doi.org/10.36922/EER026320033
Received: 3 August 2026 | Revised: 31 August 2026 | Accepted: 14 September 2026 | Published online: 10 October 2026
© 2026 by the Author(s). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
Download PDF
XML
Cite
Abstract

Institutional change plays an essential role in promoting public participation. Drawing on Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, this study examines whether the payoff rule is associated with villagers’ willingness to participate in rural domestic wastewater treatment management. Using survey data from 1,744 respondents in four rural regions of China and estimating ordered logit models, the results show that the payoff rule is positively and significantly associated with willingness to participate. By contrast, the effects of community attributes and biophysical conditions are more limited. Among the community attributes, only household head status, prior participation experience, and interpersonal trust are positively and significantly associated with willingness to participate, while most other demographic characteristics are statistically insignificant. This suggests that villagers’ engagement in wastewater treatment management is shaped less by static personal characteristics than by responsibility, prior collective experience, and social trust. In other words, simply improving villagers’ education or income levels does not necessarily translate into stronger engagement in wastewater treatment management. To enhance public participation in rural domestic wastewater treatment management, policymakers should introduce reasonable and affordable wastewater treatment fees while also creating more opportunities for participation and strengthening social trust at the village level.

Keywords
Rural wastewater treatment
Public participation
Payoff rule
Institutional Analysis and Development framework
China
Funding
This work was supported by the Guangdong Provincial Social Science Foundation of China (No. GD23XYJ84).
Conflict of interest
The author declares no competing interests.
References
  1. Ding L, Ren X, Gu R, Chen Y. Implementation of the “sponge city” development plan in China: an evaluation of public willingness to pay for the life-cycle maintenance of its facilities. Cities. 2019;93:13-30. doi: 10.1016/j.cities.2019.04.007
  2. Hu Z, Ye H, Kong L, Wang R. Nong Cun Sheng Huo Wu Shui Zhi Li She Shi Yun Ying Guan Li Dui Ce Yan Jiu [Research on the operation management of rural domestic sewage treatment facilities]. Environ Sustain Dev. 2016;41(1):38-40. [In Chinese]
  3. Liang X, Yue X. Challenges facing the management of wastewater treatment systems in Chinese rural areas. Water Sci Technol. 2021;84(6):1518-1526. doi: 10.2166/wst.2021.332
  4. Antwi SH, Stephens CG, Rolston A, et al. Public participation in environmental decision-making: a water sector perspective. Environ Sustain Indic. 2025;26:100656. doi: 10.1016/j.indic.2025.100656
  5. Harvey PA. Cost determination and sustainable financing for rural water services in sub-Saharan Africa. Water Policy. 2007;9(4):373-391. doi: 10.2166/wp.2007.012
  6. Kostka G, Zhang C. Tightening the grip: environmental governance under Xi Jinping. Environ Polit. 2018;27(5):769-781. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2018.1491116
  7. González-Gómez F, García-Rubio MA, Alcalá-Olid F, Ortega-Díaz MI. Outsourcing and efficiency in the management of rural water services. Water Resour Manag. 2013;27(3):731-747. doi: 10.1007/s11269-012-0212-0
  8. Jiang Y, Zevenbergen C, Ma Y. Urban pluvial flooding and stormwater management: a contemporary review of China’s challenges and “sponge cities” strategy. Environ Sci Policy. 2018;80:132-143. doi: 10.1016/j.envsci.2017.11.016
  9. Neef A. Transforming rural water governance: towards deliberative and polycentric models? Water Altern. 2009;2(1):53-60.
  10. Xu M, Zhu S, Zhang Y, Wang H, Fan B. Spatial-temporal economic analysis of modern sustainable sanitation in rural China: resource-oriented system. J Clean Prod. 2019;233:340-347. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.103
  11. Yan Y, Li P, Wang Z, et al. A decision framework for rural domestic sewage treatment models and process: evidence from Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, China. J Environ Sci. 2026;159:302-311. doi: 10.1016/j.jes.2025.05.016
  12. Wang Y, Cui H, Liu X, et al. Analytic hierarchy process method for rural domestic sewage treatment processes: a case study of Baiyangdian in China. Sep Purif Technol. 2025;371:133392. doi: 10.1016/j.seppur.2025.133392
  13. Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD). Zhōngguó Chéngxiāng Jiànshè Tǒngjì Niánjiàn 2014-2023 [China Urban-Rural Construction Statistical Yearbook 2014-2023]. Beijing: China Statistics Press; 2024. [In Chinese].
  14. Wu L, Wang Z, He Z, Xu Z, Ye H, Xu M. Zhe Jiang Sheng Nong Cun Sheng Huo Wu Shui Zhi Li She Shi de Chang Xiao Guan Li Ji Zhi Yan Jiu [Long-term management mechanisms of rural domestic sewage treatment facilities in Zhejiang Province]. Environ Sci Manag. 2015;40(11):6-9. [In Chinese]
  15. Chu J. Nong Min Can Yu Nong Cun Sheng Huo Zhi Li Yi Yuan de Ying Xiang Yin Su Fen Xi: Ji Yu Da Bie Shan Qu de Diao Yan Shu Ju [Analysis on influencing factors of farmers’ willingness to participate in rural domestic sewage disposal: Based on the survey of Dabieshan]. J Shanxi Agric Univ Soc Sci Ed. 2021;20(3):58-670. [In Chinese] doi: 10.13842/j.cnki.issn1671-816X.2021.03.008
  16. Liang X, Liang Y, Chen C, Van Dijk M P. Implementing water policies in China: a policy cycle analysis and case study of Sponge program cities. Sustainability. 2020;12(13):5261-5272. doi: 10.3390/su12135261
  17. Liu Y, Cheng Y, Li T, Ni J, Norman S. Information disclosure and public participation in environmental management: evidence from the river chief system in China. China Econ Rev. 2024;85:102168. doi: 10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102168
  18. Videras J. The influence of social relationships on pro-environment behaviors. J Environ Econ Manag. 2012;63(1):35-50. doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.07.006
  19. Jarrell ML, Ozymy J, McGurrin D. How to encourage conflict in the environmental decision-making process: imparting lessons from civic environmentalism to local policy-makers. Local Environ. 2013;18(2):184-200. doi: 10.1080/13549839.2012.729567
  20. Maki A, Burns RJ, Ha L, Rothman AJ. Paying people to protect the environment: a meta-analysis of financial incentive interventions to promote pro-environmental behaviors. J Environ Psychol. 2016;47:242-255. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvp.2016.07.006
  21. Ostrom E, Gardner R. Coping with asymmetries in the commons: self-governing irrigation systems can work. J Econ Perspect. 1993;7(4):93-112. doi: 10.1257/jep.7.4.93
  22. Ostrom E. Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems. Am Econ Rev. 2010;100(3):641-672. doi: 10.1257/aer.100.3.641
  23. Chen F, Sun Z, Zhao Y. The effects of social capital and family income on farmers’ participation in rural public goods provision. J Rural Stud. 2024;109:103332. doi: 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2024.103332
  24. Aidoo M, Prah S, Asante IS, Sackey CK, Asante BO. Cultivating a thriving agricultural sector: unveiling the drivers of farmer participation in agricultural development interventions in Ghana. Soc Sci Humanit Open. 2025;11:101297. doi: 10.1016/j.ssaho.2025.101297
  25. Quinn B, Henderson S, Hollywood L, Angioloni S, Caskie P. Factors affecting farmer participation in agri-environment schemes in the uplands of Northern Ireland. J Rural Stud. 2025;116:103598. doi: 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2025.103598
  26. Meinzen-Dick R, Raju KV, Gulati A. What affects organization and collective action for managing resources? Evidence from canal irrigation systems in India. World Dev. 2002;30(4):649-666. doi: 10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00130-9
  27. Li RQ, van den Brink M, Woltjer J. Rules for the governance of coastal and marine ecosystem services: an evaluative framework based on the IAD framework. Land Use Policy. 2016;59:298-309. doi: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.09.008
  28. Ajzen I. From intentions to actions: a theory of planned behavior. In: Kuhl J, Beckmann J, eds. Action Control: From Cognition to Behavior. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer; 1985:11-39. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3_2
  29. Crawford SES, Ostrom E. A grammar of institutions. In: Ostrom E. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press; 2005:137-174.
  30. Black M. Models and Metaphors. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press; 1962.
  31. Zhang Z, Zhao L. Voluntary monitoring of households in waste disposal: an application of the institutional analysis and development framework. Resour Conserv Recycl. 2019;143:45-59. doi: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.12.018
  32. Su Y, Li Y, Chen X, Wang Y, Zang L. Farmland titling, farmland adjustment and rural collective action: application of institutional analysis and development framework using evidence from China’s irrigation commons. J Rural Stud. 2023;102:103089. doi: 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2023.103089
  33. Ostrom E, Ahn TK. The Meaning of Social Capital and its Link to Collective Action. In: Handbook of Social Capital. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing; 2009. doi: 10.4337/9781848447486.00008
  34. Olson M. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press; 1965.
  35. Coase RH. The problem of social cost. J Law Econ. 1960;3:1-44. doi: 10.1086/466560
  36. Zhang X, Fan S, Zhang L, Huang J. Local governance and public goods provision in rural China. J Public Econ. 2004;88(12):2857-2871. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.07.004
  37. Festinger L. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford University Press; 1957.
  38. Ostrom E. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press; 2005.
  39. Adewale HA, Claire J. The role of farmer discussion groups in promoting sustainable farming practices: drivers of participation and environmental impact. Ecol Indic. 2025;177:113714. doi: 10.1016/j.ecolind.2025.113714
  40. Zhang Y, Hu N, Yao L, Zhu Y, Ma Y. The role of social network embeddedness and collective efficacy in encouraging farmers’ participation in water environmental management. J Environ Manage. 2023;340:117959. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2023.117959
Next article in this issue
Share
Back to top
Explora: Environment and Resource, Electronic ISSN: 3060-9046 Published by AccScience Publishing
We use cookies on our website to ensure you get the best experience.
Read more about our cookies here
Accept